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There is widespread consensus that current healthcare costs are unsustainable, and that
efficiencies could be achieved by reorganising care and making greater use of information
technology, in particular nationally available electronic health records. Such approaches
have, however, been difficult to implement, partly because incentives for uptake are
weak. In this article we argue that the difficulties go deeper than calculations of costs and
benefits, and include disruptions to the complex moral orders that surround the production
and exchange of health information. Using the introduction of national electronic health
records in England and Australia as examples, we show how attempts to reshape and
transfer distributions of rights and responsibilities developed in the age of paper into the
digital world go awry. We suggest that a fundamental rethinking of the role of ‘records’ in
healthcare may be an integral component of the moral re-ordering required to transform
health care through such means.
Key words: Disruptive innovation, electronic health records, moral order, positioning
theory
I n t roduct ion
There is widespread consensus among policy-makers and researchers that current systems
of healthcare are unsustainable. In many developed nations, ageing populations and
increasing chronic disease, combined with rising expectations, have led to escalating
costs. Many commentators claim that deep-seated reforms are necessary, and that
healthcare would be cheaper, more efficient and better co-ordinated if more use were
made of digital technologies that share information across organisational boundaries
(Department of Health, 2008; National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission,
2009a; Christensen et al., 2009). Such technologies, however, have been difficult to
implement. In particular, attempts to build information systems that compile and exchange
health records on a national scale, such as England’s Summary Care Record (SCR) and
Australia’s Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR), have been plagued
by controversies and delays (Timmins, 2011; Townsend, 2012).
In this article we explore why these systems are so challenging. We begin by
acknowledging, along with others (Christensen et al., 2009; Westbrook and Braithwaite,
2010), that these technologies potentially enable disruptive innovations in healthcare.
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That is, rather than facilitating incremental improvements to current practices, they can
support transformations in the way care is delivered. This capacity is the source of
both their reforming potential and the problems they pose for developers, implementers
and users. If the problems can be overcome, their capacity to improve care may be
realised. However, this requires a different understanding of what these technologies are
implicated in disrupting. To date, researchers working in this area have mostly highlighted
disturbances to work routines and business models. In particular, they have focussed on
disruptions to traditional workflows that reflect provider-centric models of care (Hendy
et al., 2005; Westbrook and Braithwaite, 2010; Currie and Finnegan, 2011).
We argue, however, that the potential for disruption goes far deeper than this. National
systems of electronic health records do not just unsettle medical routines and the business
models underpinning the provision of care, they also challenge the moral orders through
which risks, rights and responsibilities pertaining to health records are distributed and
managed. These moral dimensions emerge in debates about privacy and consent, and
reveal the paradoxical nature of the ‘value’ that the digitisation of records putatively adds
to healthcare encounters.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we review literature on disruptive innovation in
healthcare and suggest how it can be extended by taking account of the moral ordering
that distributes rights and responsibilities among participants in care. We then describe
debates that have occurred over the introduction of national electronic health record
systems in England and Australia, and argue that we need to go beyond a focus on business
models and bring in a consideration of the moral dimensions of divisions of labour in
healthcare. We conclude by arguing that the tensions accompanying the introduction of
electronic health records may be due to a basic inability to transfer moral orders that
governed medical information in the age of paper into the digital world. A fundamental
rethinking of the use of information in healthcare may be required that is more compatible
with the dynamic, relational aspects of care that are supported by digitisation.
Dis rup t i ve innova t ion in h ea l thcare – bus iness mode ls and mora l o rders
The theory of disruptive innovation emerged from the field of business administration
to explain how seemingly successful business models and products are challenged and
replaced by newer, cheaper, entrants to a market, partly because incumbent firms seem
unable to respond before it is too late. The upshot is far-reaching change that either
sweeps away or transforms entire industries (Bower and Christensen, 1995). This thesis
has recently been applied to public services, such as healthcare and education, in the hope
that a better understanding of what inhibits innovation in these sectors can help ‘cure’
their inefficiencies and high costs (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Christensen et al.,
2008, 2009). In their seminal application of the theory to healthcare, Christensen and
colleagues (2009) argue that many of its problems derive from the fact that hospitals and
primary care practices have been allowed to become complex and confused institutions.
They require high costs to administer that detract from patient care. In their analysis,
these problems are caused by the persistence of a business model which dates from the
nineteenth century. That is, hospitals and general practices, albeit with some modification
and additions over the years, essentially operate as ‘solution shops’, where clinical experts
‘diagnose and recommend solutions to unstructured problems’ as they are presented in
situ by patients (2009: 20). Doctors practice ‘intuitive medicine’ on a fee for service basis,
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collecting data from tests, imaging equipment and physical examinations of the patient
to develop diagnoses and prescribe treatments.
Over the years a second business model has also emerged. Accumulated evidence
concerning what works in healthcare has allowed some procedures to become
standardised, repeatable and controllable. Such treatments add value to healthcare
outcomes with such certainty that, once a definitive diagnosis has been made, the service
can be charged on a fee fixed to the output, which normally comes with a guarantee.
These so-called value-adding processes can be highly efficient when organised into
specialist hospitals or clinics where the high overheads associated with their mixing
with solution shop business models can be reduced. Practitioners who can accumulate
appropriate medical data to provide an evidence-base for their value adding processes
can, in principle, therefore disrupt the solution shop approach to dealing with such health
conditions.
A third, more emergent business model is based around the idea of facilitated
networks. This model challenges established models of care by offering, in principle
at least, a more patient-centred approach in which providers and patients ‘co-produce’
healthcare (Dunston et al., 2009). This model is relevant to people with chronic conditions
whose treatment involves different medical specialists and behavioural changes that
require them to take more responsibility for their own health. Compiling information on
such conditions and sharing it among patients and those engaged in their care become
a vital part of long-term management. Indeed, patients may be able to learn from each
other, thus enhancing mutual well-being.
Christensen et al. see a place for all three models in future healthcare, but argue that
instead of the current confused mix, the models need to be separated and reorganised.
Expensive ‘solution shops’ should be reserved for complex problems, while well-
understood conditions can be treated by less qualified practitioners according to rule-
based procedures. Facilitated networks can reduce costs further by helping patients
to manage known and chronic conditions themselves (2009: 131). In this reorganised
system, no one health professional is responsible for coordinating an individual’s care.
Instead, electronic records provide the ‘connective tissue that draws and holds together
the individual elements’ of care (2009: 132). According to Christensen et al. (2009: 130–
43), the fact that such records have been promoted for some time, but have rarely been
successfully implemented, is due to the current confused state of medical practice and
the lack of a coherent business model that makes their uptake worthwhile
The ‘disruptive innovation’ thesis has enhanced our understanding of industrial and
business change in the private sector, and can highlight in new ways the problems
that afflict healthcare around the world, and possible paths to their solution. It has
been taken up by others advocating the development of electronic health records (for
example, Westbrook and Braithwaite, 2010; Fasano, 2013). However, in our view these
reformers have seriously underestimated the depth of the changes required to support
the co-production of healthcare through facilitated networks. As Dunston et al. (2009)
note, advocates of co-production, in which patients and doctors become partners in
care, tend to focus on ‘instrumental and technical recommendations’, while leaving
cultural change issues under-theorised, if they are theorised at all. An important aspect
of the cultural changes needed to support the co-production and sharing of electronic
records concerns relationships among individuals, their healthcare providers and the
governments that regulate care. Shifting the balance of power over medical information
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potentially transforms the identities of those participating in care (Dunston et al., 2009).
These transformations can be fruitfully explored using ideas from the field of social
psychology, and in particular concepts developed by Rom Harré and colleagues (2009).
These researchers observed how individuals discursively construct their identities and
relationships by positioning themselves and others within ‘moral orders’. Moral orders
are collectively negotiated systems of ’rights, obligations and duties’ that mediate social
and professional interactions (Davies and Harré, 1990; Harré and Slocum, 2003; Harré
et al., 2009). Thus, in most developed nations, citizens claim a ‘right’ to healthcare based
on their vulnerability to sickness or disability, and see its provision as a state responsibility.
Doctors, as part of their professional identities, have rights and responsibilities with respect
to medical information and patient care. In the moral orders of healthcare, medical records
are more than mere repositories of information. They mediate relationships among the
state, healthcare providers and citizens by providing an audit trail that can be used to
legitimate actions or allocate blame when care goes awry (Berg and Bowker, 1997).
In the solution shop model, medical records are clinical in nature and controlled by
doctors. Their disclosure to patients is largely a medical prerogative and contingent on
clinical interpretation to render them meaningful and actionable. In the value-added
model, healthcare providers’ ‘right’ to autonomous practice is constrained, but they
still retain control over, and responsibility for, medical information about patients. A
facilitated network model, supported by electronic records owned and controlled by
patients, represents a fundamental shift in these rights and responsibilities. The digitisation
of records may make them more accessible, but it also complicates practices that have
been established over decades to ensure data quality and privacy. Moral orders that were
developed in the age of paper records do not translate easily into the electronic era.
Below, we illustrate how attempts to introduce national systems of electronic health
records in England and Australia disrupted the moral orders through which health
information is collected and exchanged. Both attempts were inspired by the benefits
identified by Christensen et al. (2009). That is, the SCR and PCEHR were promoted as
facilitators of self-care and connective tissue holding a fragmented health system together
(Department of Health, 2002a, 2008; National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission,
2009a, 2009b). However, they soon became mired in controversy, as redistributions of
rights and responsibilities among the state, healthcare professionals and citizens were
vigorously debated. The controversies played out differently in each nation, influenced
by pre-existing moral orders, details of technology design and the configurations of
institutions through which healthcare is delivered. In both cases, however, the issues
that emerged illustrate the degree to which policymakers who were seduced by visions
of ‘streamlined’ healthcare failed to take account of the moral re-ordering required when
entrenched patterns of information management are disrupted by digitisation.
Eng land ’s Summary C are Record
In England, as in most developed countries, healthcare providers have traditionally been
responsible for ensuring that the information they hold about their patients is accurate,
confidential and secure, that any disclosures to third parties are for authorised purposes
only and that such disclosures have the implicit or explicit consent of patients.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the British government promoted the use of information
technology in healthcare, and many hospitals and GP clinics implemented new systems
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(Department of Health, 1992; Leaning, 1993). However, increasing digitisation and
interconnectedness led to concerns about privacy. While paper records can be lost or
stolen, the ease with which electronic data can be copied and distributed, and the
potential damage that can be caused by hackers, means that digitisation creates significant
new risks (Davies, 1996). The government tried to manage these risks through the Data
Protection Acts of 1984 and 1998 and its endorsement of recommendations put forward
by the Caldicott Committee (Caldicott, 1997). These measures sought to extend the moral
orders that governed information in the paper era into the digital age by creating new
positions of data controller, data protection supervisor and Caldicott guardian, with
new responsibilities for ensuring that electronic data are handled ‘fairly and lawfully’.
These attempts to fortify the moral orders surrounding health information shaped the
development of England’s national system of electronic health records during the late
1990s and into the 2000s. However, enduring controversies over the ‘right’ of the state
to extract data from citizens’ medical records complicated the development of electronic
‘connective tissue’ among providers, and patients have been reluctant to assume the
responsibilities for self-management implicated in the ‘facilitated network’ model of care.
England’s Summary Care Record (SCR) grew out of an ambitious attempt to replace
and connect existing fragmented information systems across the National Health Service
(NHS) through a ‘National Program for Information Technology (NPfIT)’ (Department
of Health, 2002a). The intention was to provide ‘a seamless continuum of care for an
individual patient or service user across all care settings’ (Department of Health, 2002b:
19). From the outset, the Department of Health (DH) assured citizens that, apart from
exceptions such as emergencies, their consent would be required before information
about them could be shared (2002b: 23). However, in the initial plans this consent
would only be elicited on a ‘one-off’ basis after records had been uploaded into the
system (National Health Service, 2003: 72). In other words, the DH assumed a right to
extract records from GPs’ computers without the involvement of providers or the explicit
consent of citizens. While people could exercise some control over who could see their
information once it was uploaded, they did not have the right to opt out of the system
altogether. They were, however, granted an additional right to access their own records
through a portal titled HealthSpace (National Health Service, 2005).
The assumed ‘right’ of the state to upload records was hotly contested and eroded
over time. At first, anyone who objected had to prove that they would suffer ‘significant
distress or damage’ if their information were included (Anonymous, 2005; National Health
Service, 2005: 6). Connecting for Health, the body responsible for delivering NPfIT, issued
a ‘Care Record Guarantee’ that tried to reassure people that their records would be secure
(National Health Service, 2005), but this did not placate critics. Public campaigns were
mounted. Opponents pointed out that the Data Protection Act gave citizens the right
to refuse to have their information copied from one database to another. They were
not required to prove ‘distress’ (Collins, 2006; Leigh and Evans, 2006; Carvel, 2006a;
TheBigOptOut, ND).
Initially the DH held its ground, claiming that privacy considerations were less
important than the benefits that would follow implementation (Carvel, 2006a, 2006b).
However in 2006, it backed down. Citizens would now be informed about impending
uploads, and given the option of opting out (Carvel, 2006c). Changes to the consent model
were made after trials of the system, in which healthcare workers expressed unease about
accessing the records of people who had not opted out. In their view, the assumption
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of ‘implied consent’ for these individuals was not substantial enough (Greenhalgh et al.,
2008). Since 2008, unless they are unconscious or otherwise lacking capacity, patients
need to give consent for their SCR to be viewed at each clinical encounter (Carlisle, 2008).
Despite this moral reordering, many doctors still opposed the system (Anonymous,
2007, 2008). During the development stages, they lobbied successfully to have the
information in the SCR reduced to allergies, prescriptions and adverse reactions. This
was a response to concerns about data quality as well as patient privacy (Anonymous,
2006). Doctors have consistently positioned themselves as protectors of their patients’
privacy. According to surveys conducted in 2006 and 2007, 50 to 60 per cent of doctors
would not upload data without explicit patient consent (Carvel, 2006d, 2007). The British
Medical Association favoured an opt-in approach (House of Commons Health Committee,
2007: 32), and in some regions doctors have encouraged patients to opt out (Nowottny,
2009; Anonymous, 2010).
As is well documented, the NPfIT as a whole (dubbed ‘the largest computer project
in the world’) ran into significant problems and was eventually terminated (House of
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2011; Cross, 2011). However, reviews of the
SCR recommended it be retained, along with other elements of the system which had
worked in practice (Keogh and Saddler, 2010). Roll out escalated during 2010 and by
February 2013, 23 million SCRs had been created (Davies, 2013). Despite continued
pockets of scepticism (Anderson, 2010; Davies, 2013), a new moral order has settled
around the SCR, which at the time of writing, consists of a minimal amount of information
that can be accessed in emergencies. Additional information can be added, but only with
the explicit consent of patients (National Health Service, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). The fifth
version of the NHS’s Care Record Guarantee assures people that they ‘will have control’
over their records (National Health Service, 2011b: 1). There is some evidence that SCRs
are being accessed by providers delivering care after hours (Praities, 2012), but it is some
way from supplying the ‘connective tissue’ that ensures continuity of care across time and
space, or a ‘facilitated network’ that encourages self-care. The HealthSpace portal that
enabled people to view their SCR and maintain their own records online did not prove
popular and was scrapped in 2012 (Crispin, 2011; Whitfield, 2012a). The Department of
Health has promised that by 2015 patients will be able to access their electronic records
by other means (Raywood, 2012; Whitfield, 2012b), although a recent Parliamentary
Committee review expressed scepticism that such benefits, along with a new vision of
a ‘paperless NHS’, would ever be realised (House of Commons Committee of Public
Accounts, 2013).
If moral ordering around the SCR seems to have stabilised, controversies over the
‘right’ of the state to collect, distribute and even sell citizens’ health details continue
(Carlisle, 2011; Ramesh, 2013). Recent polices to reform the NHS include moves to
combine disparate data sets across health and social services so that information can
be shared more easily. In a process separate to the SCR, a new Health and Social Care
Information Centre receives information ‘extracted’ from GP computers for research,
auditing and planning, which is available to private companies and external researchers
(Department of Health, 2012; Department of Health and National Health Service,
2012; Todd, 2013). A second Caldicott Commission was convened in 2013 to provide
guidance on information governance (Caldicott, 2013), that is, to assist with moral re-
ordering. However, government assurances that identifiable data will be kept secure and
confidential have not prevented criticism of the reforms. In early 2013, several of the
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groups that challenged the Department of Health’s assumed right to upload patients’
records into the SCR reconvened to oppose what they see as new and serious threats to
medical confidentiality (Evenstad, 2013; medConfidential, ND).
The digitisation and sharing of health data are clearly controversial. Although
policymakers, along with analysts such as Christensen and his colleagues, often frame
the issues in terms of costs and benefits, moral conundrums relating to risks, rights
and responsibilities run deep and cannot easily be resolved, at least in England, by
‘Care Guarantees’ and other government assurances. The history of the SCR shows how
digitisation generates disruptions that seriously complicate technically inspired visions of
self-management and seamless care (Tsoukas, 1997). Battles over the moral reordering
of information management in the digital age in England are shaped by relationships in
that nation among the state, citizens and healthcare providers. To see how they played
out in different circumstances, we now turn to an account of the introduction of national
electronic health records in Australia.
Aust ra l i a ’s Persona l l y Cont ro l l ed E lec t ron ic H ea l th Record (PCEHR)
The controversies generated by Australia’s PCEHR are different to those surrounding the
SCR in England, largely because the Australian government has not assumed a right to
upload data from doctors’ information systems without patients’ explicit consent. Ever
since the failed attempt to introduce a compulsory national identity card (‘Australia
Card’) during the 1980s (Clarke, 1988), similar endeavours have encountered resistance
and been abandoned (Greenleaf, 2007; Dearne, 2007). As a result, plans to introduce
national electronic health records in Australia have required citizens to explicitly opt
in. As the name of the current system attests, the government has emphasised the
‘personal control’ that people will putatively exercise over their electronic data. Battles
over moral orders in Australia have largely revolved around the meanings of ‘personal
control’ and its impacts on medical practice, rather than the ‘right’ of the state to extract
information.
Although there were attempts to introduce national electronic health records before
2009 (Robinson et al., 2007), moves towards the current PCEHR only began to coalesce in
that year as part of a broader attempt to reform healthcare (National Health and Hospitals
Reform Commission, 2009a, 2009b). As in England, the technology was presented as
vital connective tissue enhancing the continuity of care, and a means of encouraging
responsibility among patients. The reform body that advocated the PCEHR claimed it
would shift the ‘locus of control’ over information away from providers towards citizens
(National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009b: 11–12). Citizens can decide
whether to have a PCEHR and, if so, what information is included. They can determine
which providers and other people (carers, family members) can see it. They can access
their record and audit trails to see who else has viewed it and what they have done with
it (Department of Health and Ageing, 2011).
Despite the creation of these new rights for citizens, healthcare providers still
carry significant responsibilities with respect to medical information. People opting
into the PCEHR must nominate a provider to enter their details (allergies, medications,
adverse reactions and immunisation status) into a shared health summary. Additional
documents (for example, discharge letters, X-rays, pathology results) can also be added
by professionals, if patients request. In effect, the PCEHR is a data repository accessible
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to patients and authorised others that exists in parallel with providers’ own records.
Although doctors generally support technologies that improve information flows, they
have expressed opposition to the PCEHR. There were heated discussions up to the launch
date regarding remuneration, risks and responsibilities (Dunlevy, 2012; Dearne, 2012).
Shifting the locus of control over medical data away from clinicians and into a grey area
where it is shared with patients disrupts long-standing moral orders in which professional
responsibilities for the production and use of patient information are integral components
of competent care.
Health records are not just repositories of information that can be detached from the
contexts and the moral orders through which care is delivered (Brown and Duguid,
2002), they contain traces of past medical judgments that providers are obliged to
consult and augment as part of their professional practice. They can be subjected to
scrutiny under medico-legal processes that exonerate doctors or allocate blame when
adverse patient outcomes are questioned. Relinquishing control over records contains
risks for doctors, as it is they, not patients, who are held accountable when records
are inaccurate, incomplete or out of date. Concerns over data quality spurred English
doctors to restrict information in the SCR to prescriptions, allergies and adverse reactions.
Along with computer experts, they have warned of possible mishaps as the SCR expands
and responsibilities for data quality remain diffuse (British Medical Association, 2008;
Anderson, 2010). In Australia, the broader scope of the PCEHR, combined with personal
control, has brought the issue of diffuse and unclear responsibilities to the surface. The
Australian Medical Association (AMA) advises doctors to take a defensive position with
respect to the PCEHR. Its guidelines for providers using the PCEHR recommend they
record all details of their interactions with it, and all conversations with patients about
it (Australian Medical Association, 2012). While the norms associated with ‘reasonable
care’ in the age of paper records are fairly well established, defensible standards using
shared electronic records are yet to be developed. As the AMA warns, ‘the medico-legal
risks [of the PCEHR] for medical practitioners and medical practices are unknown until
case law develops’ (Australian Medical Association, 2012: 22).
As in England, doctors in Australia generally support patients’ rights to privacy.
However, while English doctors formed alliances with privacy advocates, there has been
some tension between the groups in Australia. Bodies representing doctors have argued
that the ‘personal controls’ built into the PCEHR compromise its reliability and utility
(Australian Medical Association, 2011; Royal Australian College of General Practitioners,
2011). According to the President of the AMA, the PCEHR has ‘unacceptable complexities’
due to the ‘disproportionate emphasis given to the concerns of an extreme minority who
wish to mask details of their health record’ (Australian Medical Association, 2011: 2). In
contrast to its British counterpart, the AMA claims that an opt-out approach would be more
clinically useful and equitable, as it would make the details of disadvantaged groups (the
aged, infirm, technologically deprived) more available (O’Rourke, 2011). The AMA has
been successful in convincing at least one non-medical lobby group to support its cause.
In 2012, the Consumers’ Health Forum, Australia’s peak consumer group, announced that
it had reversed its previous position in favour of people opting-in to support an opt-out
policy (Consumers’ Health Forum, 2012). Perhaps memories of the Australia Card are
fading, and, in an age of social media, younger generations are more comfortable with
publishing their private information online.
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The PCEHR opened for registration in July 2012. Uptake was initially slow but
escalated after a publicity campaign and the deployment of ‘sign-up squads’ to hospitals
and aged care facilities (Dunlevy, 2013). By July 2013, 2.7 per cent of a population of 22
million people had registered, and 4,585 shared health summaries had been uploaded
(National e-Health Transition Authority, 2013). Debates about its utility continue and its
fate after the 2013 change of government in Australia is uncertain, especially as e-health
does not seem to be a priority for the new government (Foo, 2013). Controversies during
the introduction of the PCEHR revealed its disruptive potential, but its consequences are
yet to be realised and may never be.
Discuss ion
In introducing national systems of electronic health records, governments in England
and Australia are venturing into uncharted territory. Although they have taken different
routes, both nations have experienced controversies and delays as the systems have
proved more difficult to implement than initially envisaged. England’s attempt to build
a comprehensive system by extracting data from GP computers was challenged, and
citizens now have a right to opt out of the SCR. Australian policymakers adopted a
different strategy, implementing a system that at the time of writing only includes those
who explicitly opt in. This, combined with citizen control over content and access,
has raised a different set of concerns around data quality and the utility of records
that cover only a segment of the population. Clearly, there is no ‘one best way’ to
build a national electronic health record system, as the perceived benefits of making
information more readily available are inevitably accompanied by fears that data will be
misused.
Christensen and his colleagues attribute the patchy uptake of sharable electronic
health records to the lack of a business model that makes their creation and adoption
worthwhile. As they note, ‘it’s hard to build a practice around activities for which you’re
not paid’ (Christensen et al., 2009: 134). We agree that ‘value-adding’ is an important
consideration in the adoption of new technologies. However, providing incentives for
doctors to create and use sharable electronic health records is unlikely to solve the issues
that have proved contentious in England and Australia. There is more than remuneration at
stake, as even Christensen and colleagues now realise, since such disruptive innovations
threaten to strike at the heart of the personal and professional identities of all those
involved from consumers to clinicians. To make the point in Christensen et al.’s (2013)
revised terms, it is not just the ‘utility function’ of new services, such as electronic
records, that determines their adoption, but also the ‘identity function’ through which
such evaluations of value are made by potential adopters. No matter how cost-effective,
productive or beneficial an e-enabled service can, in principle, be predicted or shown to
be, if it threatens the self-perceptions of those who are meant to use it, it may be rejected.
‘Identity’ is ‘a formidable variable in predicting the success and scalability in disruptive
innovations’ (2013: 6). Or, as we have illustrated through the above accounts, the moral
orders that governed the use of medical information in the age of paper records are not
easily transferred to the facilitated networks of the digital era.
One possible way of getting beyond the confusion may be to reconceptualise the
status and use of information in healthcare. The current emphasis on electronic records,
as compilations of data located on servers somewhere, may be an unsustainable hangover
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from the days when the solution shop model of healthcare reigned supreme, supported by
paper records owned and controlled by doctors, even if they were not always assiduous
in their upkeep or willing to admit their centrality to medical practice (see Weed, ND).
In this situation, a moral order in which doctors hold rights over, and responsibilities
for, their content, quality and accessibility makes sense. As facilitated networks and co-
production become possible, this order breaks down as ‘records’ now exist in multiple
locations, are easily reproduced, can be accessed and possibly changed by unknown
others and, of course, can be authored by patients as well as doctors. The notion of
records that we are accustomed to, as repositories of ‘stuff’ owned exclusively by doctors,
and whose quality and utility holds steady over time regardless of context, may not
be compatible with facilitated networks. We may need new ways of thinking about
information in healthcare that are more attuned to the dynamic, relational nature of
networks and the ‘democratisation’ of who can publish to them. The value of digitisation
may lie in its capacity to infrastructuralise the means of sharing information in ways
that are becoming evident through the creation and use of sites such as Cancer Voices
NSW1 and RenalPatientView.2 Healthcare is delivered through a series of relationships,
and information that is valuable for one interaction may be irrelevant for another. Rather
than trying to fix problems of fragmentation by integrating static records, it may be more
productive to develop technologies that support flows of information through the ongoing
situated contexts in which care is delivered over time.
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Harré, R. and Slocum, N. (2003) ‘Disputes as complex social events: on the uses of positioning theory’,
Common Knowledge, 9, 1, 100–18.
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